|
America, Do you Know? |
|
Fixing a hole Published date: 10/6/2003 After three wars and years of neglect under Saddam's regime, Iraq's crisis was never going to be resolved simply or immediately. But is there actually a crisis, what is it and is it being resolved? There is a crisis but it is not the one that many predicted. The war didn't create a mass exodus of people; instead people generally stayed in their homes or moved only until the fighting had passed them by. Iraq's real crisis is far less obvious. In part it's the insidious and quiet crisis of neglect and poverty drafted by Saddam's self-serving elite and unleashed by the collapse of its fragile structures. Under Saddam's regime, many were left without safe, drinkable water; access to health care or even basic food security. Those that had access to these things enjoyed them at the whim of a capricious state that manipulated access in order to force loyalty. Sixty percent of people depended on a Byzantine system of state food handouts. Loyalty which could not be bought in this way was coerced by a state security apparatus that suppressed non-governmental organizations, political parties, tribal, religious or any other structures that smacked of alternative sources of influence. In short, the Iraqi state was a fragile and vulnerable edifice that began to crumble with the onset of war. As it vanished it left behind poverty and a decaying infrastructure that had largely been hidden. But are things continuing to spiral downwards? All but the least realistic recognize that Iraq has a long way to go before it returns to what some consider to be normality. Nevertheless, it has begun a journey towards stability that will ensure access to health care, food, water and the restoration of the utility network. The ending of economic sanctions, the rapid growth in commercial activity within the city, the beginning of commercial contracts for infrastructure repair and reconstruction, the gradual return of security, and the liberalization of access for humanitarian organizations promise much more. Whilst the power vacuum created by the regime's collapse has obviously unleashed a range of forces, few notice that an Iraqi civil society is also being born. I have heard few journalists commenting on the steady stream of ordinary Iraqi's asking for permission (no permission needed!) to begin a political party that can compete for a voice in the new Iraqi political process. Nevertheless, the Office of the Coalition Provisional Authority has faced enormous difficulties. The absence of effective law and order has, perhaps, been the most difficult and contentious. Looting was initially targeted against government buildings. I spoke with many Iraqis who rather sheepishly admitted that they were simply taking what was theirs. Others said this was a way of expressing contempt for the old regime. However, the collapse of Saddam's instruments of repression unleashed from the bottle a genii that proved stubbornly difficult to return and looting spread to other targets. The coalition response was to increase military patrols in the major cities; a toughening of policies on the possession of firearms; authorizing responsible security companies and the rapid creation of what was effectively a new police organisation. The result has been a rapid and dramatic drop in the level of looting and the night time cacophony of gunfire that characterized the first weeks of coalition control. There have also been marked improvements in the flow of traffic around the city. Queues for petrol rations have been a major source of obstruction, but more than 75 percent of petrol demand is now being satisfied and with the removal of sanctions, supplies are increasing daily. There are also increasing numbers of traffic policemen, much to the chagrin of some, but the impact on traffic flows is plain to see. There have also been major improvements in the restoration of Saddam's crumbling utility infrastructure. Baghdad is now receiving some 1300 MW of power; more than 52 percent of the prewar demand. It is also receiving 70 percent of the prewar level of potable water with plans for a major program of infrastructure repair and renewal. Many of these contracts are being subcontracted to Iraqi companies, promising to fuel a rapid growth in the Iraqi economy. However, nobody underestimates the problems with infrastructure restoration. Problems such as sewerage disposal continue and do pose a major and obvious public health risk, the limited outbreak of cholera in Basra can be seen as evidence of this. However, this needs to be taken within a context. Before the war, Saddam's regime neglected the water and sanitation systems, intentionally pumping raw effluent from 500,000 people into the Tigris, fully aware of the impact on the populations of Basra and other downstream towns. There is evidence that elements of Saddam's regime systematically destroyed machinery critical to the functioning of the water, sanitation and electricity infrastructure. The OCPA, and the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance before it, have worked alongside organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and UNICEF in a race to put in place a system that was better than before. Whilst it is true that cholera cases have increased slightly and that there remains a public health risk, the causes are not simply "the war" and the solutions cannot realistically be immediate given the scale of neglect before the conflict. Salary payments are also underway throughout the country. Progress on this issue was initially held up by difficulties in determining what a salary was actually worth. Non-cash payments, the absence of taxation (and therefore tax records) and the burning of regime records all complicated the difficulty of setting rates of pay in a currency that fluctuated dramatically and showed enormous regional variations in its value. Nevertheless, salaries are now being paid and many Iraqis have seen their wages increase. The evidence of war is also being removed. Nearly all of the burnt out tanks and vehicles destroyed in the war have already gone from Baghdad's streets and huge efforts are being directed into destroying the stockpiles of bombs and munitions left behind by the previous regime. Bearing in mind that Iraq has recently endured three wars, this process will take a long time, but already over 95 percent of burnt out armored vehicles have been removed and over three weeks ago more abandoned arms caches and unexploded bombs were being destroyed than were being reported. The port of Umm Qasr opened two months ago and is being dredged and cleared, enabling the flow of World Food Program foodstuffs and, soon, the return of commercial shipping to southern Iraq. WFP's food distribution, the largest they have ever undertaken, has also begun. Whilst there are bound to be difficulties, the speed with which WFP has gripped this process has been impressive. Work has also already begun on ensuring that whatever replaces the Oil for Food program ensures that food availability, particularly for vulnerable communities, does not become a problem. So are things getting better or is Iraq spiraling out of control? The evidence is clear that rapid improvements are being made. Whilst this does not underestimate the existence of clear and obvious problems, the question for most people is whether they can also see past the difficulties to the improvements that exist. Personally, I prefer to see both the doughnut and the hole. Stuart Gordon is a Lieutenant Colonel in the British Army and Director of Operations at the Coalition's Iraqi Assistance Center. The views expressed in this article are his and do not necessarily represent the views of the coalition or the OCPA. Direct Link: http://www.baghdadbulletin.com/pageArticle.php?article_id=15&cat_id=17 |